This article extends, in a stochastic environment, the Yagil (1987) model which establishes, in a deterministic dividend discount model, a range for the exchange ratio in a stock-for-stock merger agreement. Here, we generalize Yagil's work letting both pre-and post-merger dividends grow randomly over time. If Yagil focuses only on changes in stock prices before and after the merger, our stochastic environment allows to keep in account both shares' expected values and variance, letting us to identify a more complex bargaining region whose shape depends on mean and standard deviation of the dividends' growth rate.
Introduction, literature review and motivation
Mergers and acquisitions have been, and still are, a widely studied topic in financial literature, under both a theoretical and an empirical point of view. Companies merge for various reasons, but with a unique goal: to create synergy, the additional equity value of the newly created company (M ) when compared to the pre-existing ones, namely the acquiring (A) and the acquired, or target, (B). In a stock-for-stock merger, B's shareholders receive, for each stock they give up, r (the exchange ratio) stocks of company M . Shareholders of companies A and B will agree on some value for r only if their wealth increases after the merger.
Negotiation on r establishes the portion of synergy that goes to stockholders of pre-merger companies. It is therefore crucial to identify a bargaining region, that is a non-empty range for r.
First attempts in this direction go back to Larson and Gonedes (1969) and Yagil (1987) . Larson and Gonedes represent the value of all companies in terms of their price-earnings ratios, and determine the minimum and maximum r acceptable for all shareholders in terms of M 's price-earnings ratio.
Yagil tackles the same issue using the dividend discount model (DDM) by Williams (1938) and Gordon and Shapiro (1956) . Here the price of a common stock is the sum of all discounted future dividends companies will pay to shareholders; Further, dividends are assumed to grow at a constant and deterministic rate. Yagil determines the bargaining region for each synergy generating M dividends' growth rate.
In both these models, A and B's shareholders have conflicting interests: the acquiring (acquired) company aims at fixing r as low (high) as possible. Moretto and Rossi (2008) determine, in an equilibrium context, the exchange ratio in terms of the expected synergy created by the merger and the companies' riskiness, while Toll and Hering (2017) analyze the effects of a merger by means of utility theory. This paper generalizes Yagil's model by exploiting the Stochastic Dividend Discount Model (SDDM) (Hurley and Johnson (1994) , Hurley and Johnson (1998) , Yao (1997), and Hurley (2013) ). Future dividends are driven by a stochastic growth rate and evolve in a Markovian fashion. Along with an expression for the expected current stock price, recently, a formula for variance (Agosto and Moretto (2015) ) and covariance between stock prices (Agosto et al. (2016) ) have been de-termined. A further step in this direction can be found in D'Amico (2013), D'Amico (2016), and Barbu et al. (2017) , where stochastic dividends evolve according to a more general semi-Markov dynamics.
In our stochastic setting, shareholders accept to merge if they all benefit not only from an increase in the expected value of their random wealth but also from a reduction in its variance. The bargaining area, now a function of both mean and standard deviation of M dividends' growth rate, shows that large values for this dividends' expected growth rate is not always good news as this quantity affects also company M stock price variance. Stockholders might, consequentely, end up, after the merger, in a riskier position.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical framework and determines the bargaining region in a SDDM setting, Section 3 provides a numerical example, Section 4 eventually concludes.
A SDDM extension of Yagil's model
The main assumption behind the stochastic extension of the Dividend Discount Model is that the total amount of dividendsD(t) a company pays in t to its shareholders evolve through time by means of the stochastic recursive equatioñ D (t + 1) =D (t) (1 +g), being D(0) the last paid certain dividend andg the dividends' growth rate represented by the following finite-state random variable,
.., n, and p 1 + ... + p n = 1.
Subscript i = A, B, M relates to the acquiring, acquired, and resulting companies. We assume that each company is characterized by a specific distribution forg, withḡ i and σg i , respectively, its expected value and variance. Let N i denote the number of company i's outstanding stocks andd i (t) =D i (t)/N i its random dividends-per-share (dps) at time t. The current random stock price is
being k i company i constant and deterministic risk-adjusted discount rate. Com-
and will grow according tog M . Hurley and Johnson (1994, 1998) and Yao (1997) prove that the expected stock price is, as long as k i >ḡ i ,
Agosto and Moretto (2015) determine the stock price variance
and where
has to be strictly positive. It will reveal handy to denote the coefficient of variation ofP i (0) as
The crucial assumption in Yagil is the choice of a deterministic growth rate for M . In his setting, the agreement is attainable if stockholders of both company
A and B enjoy a positive gain in wealth, that is P M (0) ≥ P A (0) and rP M (0) ≥ P B (0), being P i (0) the stock price of company i resulting when a deterministic growth rate replacesg i in (1).
Moreover, Yagil assumes that the discount rate of the resulting company is the weighted average of k A and k B , with weights equal to the relative equity values.
That is like saying that the merger does not influence the overall risk of the resulting company with respect of the pre-existing ones. Here, k M is calculated accordingly.
The SDDM generalization of Yagil's model assumes that shareholders of com-pany A (resp. B) are better off, in terms of expected values, when
and, in terms of variance, when
hold. An increase in terms of expected wealth for both groups of shareholders (i.e., condition (3) holds) occurs when
There is a reduction in variance (i.e., condition (4) holds)
Interval (5) is not empty whenW M (0) ≥W A (0) +W B (0) that is, the merger creates synergy with positive expected value; (5) collapses to a unique point r * = P B (0)/P A (0) in case of no synergy, that is ifW M (0) =W A (0) +W B (0). Interval (6) is instead not empty when
Condition (7) carries some interesting remarks. Firstly, as the coefficient of variation resembles the reciprocal of the Sharpe's ratio, shareholders should prefer stocks with smaller f , that is with larger risk premium (per unit of deviation).
This means that if company M guarantees a sufficiently large risk compensation, stockholders will benefit from a reduction in their wealth's variance. In case of no synergy, (7) becomes
whose rhs term is the weighted average of f A and f B with, as weights, the relative equity values of A and B. Merger is, then, profitable if M is less risky than an equity-valued 'portfolio' of A and B.
Unlike (5), in case of no synergy interval (6) does not collapse into a single value. SubstitutingW M (0) =W A (0) +W B (0) into (6) leads to
This interval shrinks to r * only when f M = f A and f M = f B , the case in which A and B have the same Sharpe ratio and no risk reduction is possible.
Finally, it is easy to prove that the intersection between (5) and (6) is not
; that is, the new company is even less risky than the less risky of both A and B, a situation that guarantees proper diversification.
This condition also ensures that (8) holds so that (9) contains, at least, r * .
A numerical example
To better understand the effects of SDDM on the pre-merger negotiation, thus highlighting the difference with Yagil's setting, we consider a numerical example where the combined effect ofḡ M and σg M is studied. This allows to check if a negotiation is possible, and how easily the two parties will conclude a merging agreement. We assume that the larger the region defined simultaneously by (5) and (6) the 'simpler' the agreement will be.
In our general setting, the extrema of intervals (5) and (6) are monotonic with respect toḡ M and σg M . If we define the constant
interval (5) can be rewritten as
The infimum (resp. the supremum) of this interval decreases (resp. increases) inḡ M ; the bargaining region defined by (3) becomes larger because the expected wealth of shareholders of both companies increases; concluding an agreement 
the region defined by (4) can be written as
Again, it is straightforward to prove that the infimum (resp. the supremum) of this interval increases (resp. decreases) both inḡ M (for each positive σg M ) and σg M (for eachḡ M > −1). Here, room for negotiation diminishes if the postmerger standard deviation σg M increases because it becomes difficult to achieve a lower post-merger risk. An increase inḡ M has the same effect; this is so because the mean is the value that minimizes the centered second order moment. Quite interestingly, and somehow counter-intuitively, a variation inḡ M has two opposite consequences on the region of negotiation, the overall result depending on which effect is dominating. standard deviation, coefficient of variation, absolute (W i ) and relative (ω i ) equity values). As f B > f A , the target company is riskier than the acquiring. According to Yagil, the discount rate for M is 5.72%.
As a benchmark, if g M replacesḡ M Figure 1 presents, in the plane (ḡ M , r), the Yagil's bargaining region, defined by the extrema of interval (5); each point belonging to the region between the two curves, on the right of their intersection point, is such that the stock price of the new company satisfy shareholders of both companies, being admissible for the negotiation. In Figure 2 we fix four levels of σg M , namely 1%, 1.5%, 2%, 2.5%, and superimpose, for each of them, extrema of interval (6) the minimum accepted rate is always less than 0.5 because the reduction in the expected dividends' growth rate is adequately rewarded with a smaller level of risk. Lastly, as long as σg M increases, the minimum r accepted by B increases whereas the maximum r offered by A decreases. This occurs until the recuction in standard deviation is no more sufficient to satisfy shareholders' requests.
Concluding remarks
This article deals with exchange ratio determination model by Yagil and tries to extend it into a stochastic framework where both expected value and variance of stockholders' wealth have to be considered when evaluating a plausible range for the exchange ratio in stock-for-stock merger agreements. It turns out that dividends' rate of growth of the company that the merger creates plays a double, 
